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THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM OF SOURCES: THE
FIRST AMENDMENT FAILS THE FOURTH ESTATE
Joel M. Gora*

It is a great honor to have this article appear in this Symposium,
Are Journalists Privileged?, because of the identity of the principal
participants. Anthony Lewis almost singlehandedly invented the genre
of journalism about law;' Victor Kovner has been a pioneer in
fashioning the law's protection of journalism and journalists; Max
Frankel, prize-winning reporter and editor at the New York Times,
supplied the professional understanding and rationale for why
journalism needs and is entitled to claim the law's protection. 2 There
are many intersections of law and journalism-the modem era of
defamation law and its becoming subjected to First Amendment
4
restraints, 3 questions of media ownership and concentration of power,
5
issues of protection of media content especially in this digital age, and
occasionally even questions of prior restraint and the press-the
crucible which gave rise to the underpinnings of the First Amendment
6
originally.
The intersecting issue that is the subject of this Symposium has
bedeviled law and journalism for a generation. Fifty years ago this
year, the first prominent decision attempting to reconcile the First
Amendment claim of a right to protect confidential sources with the
judicial system's demand to discover and disclose all legally relevant
evidence was handed down in the well-known case of Garland v.
Torre.7 In that case, then-Circuit Judge Potter Stewart fashioned a
careful balancing approach to reconcile these conflicting demands in a
way which the intervening years have not necessarily much improved.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., Pomona College, 1963; L.L.B., Columbia
University, 1967. 1 wish to acknowledge the Brooklyn Law School Dean's Summer Research
Fund which supported this article, and I wish to thank Stefanie D. Shaffer, Brooklyn Law School,
Class of 2008, for her research assistance.
I See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
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See Max Frankel, The Washington Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 25, 2007, at 40.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
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In attempting to put these issues into a larger perspective, and to
mark the journey that we have all taken, I would like to touch upon
three themes: (1) where did we start?, (2) where have we come?, and
(3) what have we learned?
I.

WHERE DID WE START?

My own personal Zelig-like involvement in the issue of the right of
journalists to protect their sources began in the spring of 1970, even
before there was a "Deep Throat." As is well known, the key case
guiding us all on this issue is the Supreme Court's 1972 ruling in
Branzburg v. Hayes8 on whether the press should have a First
Amendment right to protect its confidential sources. As a young lawyer
with the ACLU, I wrote a brief in that case, siding, not surprisingly,
with the press, and that case gave me the privilege of working, for the
first time, with Floyd Abrams, as well as many other prominent media
lawyers. But there was another reason for my interest in press rights,
namely, the fact that my wife, Ann Ray Martin, being a Newsweek
reporter, had a few confidential sources of her own to protect, one of
whom, occasionally, was this writer. In fact, we would sometimes joke
that whenever we had a conversation, there were three potential
privileges working simultaneously: husband/wife, lawyer/client, and
journalist/source.
But of course, these issues of whether journalists can protect their
confidential sources are not laughing matters. They were raised most
powerfully in the Branzburg case a generation ago in a setting eerily
reminiscent of the current mood in the country. Then, as now, a war
deeply divided the country, and there were sharp antagonisms between
the press and the Administration on a wide variety of issues, including
the attempt to enjoin the publication of the leaked Pentagon Papers and
to prosecute the Deep Throat in that case, Daniel Ellsberg. 9
The interlocking of events was stunning. The lawyers who
represented the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case in 1971,
got that assignment as a result of working on the Times' brief in the
Branzburg case. The Pentagon Papers were leaked in 1971 by a
confidential source, Daniel Ellsberg. The plumbers unit was set up to
plug leaks like that, leading to the Watergate burglary in 1972. That
burglary, which would give us our most famous confidential source-I
am referring of course to the famous "Deep Throat" who was revealed,
after his death, to have been Mark Felt, a high level FBI official8 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
9 See generally NY. Times, 403 U.S. at 713.
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occurred ten days before the Supreme Court's Branzburg decision on
the constitutional right to protect such confidential sources.
The specific dispute over confidential sources in Branzburg came
in the context of cutting-edge reporting about the counterculture:
articles about trafficking in marijuana and other drugs, stories about the
Black Panther Party. Government officials believed they were properly
investigating crimes, and that the grand jury had the right to "every
man's evidence." The reporters claimed, on the other hand, that the
purpose of constitutional protection for freedom of the press was to
enable them to inform the public about critical issues, that their ability
to do so depended on their ability to gather information from
confidential sources, and that if they had to disclose those sources in
grand jury investigations, the sources would dry up, and the public
would be without the information necessary to govern effectively.
The press and its supporters had a strong basis for their claim of
powerful First Amendment protection for journalistic processes. In its
brief to the Supreme Court in the Branzburg case, the ACLU pointed
out the Court had consistently recognized that a free and unfettered
press was the indispensable prerequisite to democratic government and
that the press was the constitutionally-appointed agent of the public's
right to know and the constitutionally-designated facilitator of the free
flow of information to the public. Here are some of the precedents we
cited to the Court:
The [primary] purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to
preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public
information. The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the
country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light
on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other
instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the
most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be
regarded otherwise than with grave concern .... A free press stands
and the
as one of the great interpreters between the government
10
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, [and] that a free
press is a condition of a free society."11
The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public
interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public
10 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
11 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of
12
public events and occurrences.
The primary purpose of the First Amendment is "producing an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs." 13
This
understanding was nowhere more eloquently and precisely summed up
than by Justice Hugo L. Black, in his final opinion on the Court in the
Pentagon Papers Case, a year before the Branzburg decision:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The
Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government
and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In
my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous
reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post and other
newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the
Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of
government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did
precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do. 14
The point was clear: in our scheme of things the press exists not
primarily to provide employment, to advertise products, or even to
make profits, but to inform the public. Any inhibition on the press's
ability to do so impairs one of the fundamental understandings of our
political democracy. The press is constitutionally protected so that it
could disseminate information to the public. The cases suggested a
powerful emphasis on the public's right to know, as enhanced by a free
flow of information to the public, as enforced by the press as an agent of
5
the public's right to know.'
Not only were there these extremely strong understandings of the
role of the press in gathering information for dissemination to the
public, but they existed in a constitutional environment that was

generally hospitable to strong First Amendment claims. The First
Amendment landscape in 1972 was more protective than it had ever
12 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
13 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
14 See N.Y. Times Co., v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (Black, J., concumng) (1971).
15 In more recent times, the Court has seemed less willing to protect the free flow of
information to the public, see McConnell. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), though
more recent indications in this area are more positive, see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007).
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been. The Supreme Court, in a series of contemporaneous decisions,
had established the maximum degree of protection for speech about
government and politics.
In cases like New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 16 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,17 Brandenburg v.
Ohio,' 8 Cohen v. California'9 and New York Times Co. v. United
States,20 the Court fashioned the broadest protection to that time for
political speech and established the central role of the First Amendment
as freeing people to criticize the government, maximizing the flow of
political information to the public, giving individuals and institutions
the power to choose how and when to speak with minimal governmental
interference or direction. To be sure, the Court was not extending First
Amendment protection in all cases as far as the eye could see, and it
upheld some regulation of political speech in certain contexts such as
broadcasting and government employment. 2 1 But these seemed special
contexts, and apart from them First Amendment claims generally
enjoyed smooth sailing. It felt, as we sailed into the seas of seeking
protection for confidential sources, that we had a strong First
Amendment wind at our backs.
So it was not surprising that, when the Supreme Court resolved
these conflicting claims and established the First Amendment standard
in Branzburg the case produced the following opinion:
[T]here is no "compelling need" that can be shown which qualifies
the reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand
jury, unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime. His
immunity... is therefore quite complete, for, absent his involvement

in a crime, the First Amendment protects him against an appearance
before a grand jury and if he is involved in a crime, the Fifth
Amendment stands as a barrier. Since ... there is no area of inquiry

not protected by a privilege, the reporter need not appear for the
futile purpose of invoking one to each question.... [A] newsman
has an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury ....
The New York Times . . . takes the amazing position that First

Amendment rights are to be balanced against other needs or
conveniences of government. My belief is that all of the "balancing"
was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First
Amendment in absolute terms, they repudiated the timid, watereddown, emasculated versions of the First Amendment which the
22
Government and the New York Times advance in [this] case.
16 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17 418 U.S. 241 (1968).
18 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
19 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
20 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
21 See U.S Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
22 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712-13 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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A reporter is no better than his source of information. Unless he has
a privilege to withhold the identity of his source, he will be the
victim of governmental intrigue or aggression. If he can be
summoned to testify in secret before a grand jury, his sources will
dry up and the attempted exposure, the effort to enlighten the public,
will be ended. If what the Court sanctions today becomes settled
law, then the reporter's main function in American society will be to
pass on to the public the press releases which the various
23
departments of government issue.
That last sentence probably reveals a professorial ploy on my part.
Those stirring passages came not from the Court's opinion, but from the
dissent of Justice William 0. Douglas, one of Court's greatest
champions of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. But it is a
reminder of the real baseline from which we should view today's
battles. Because, in the Branzburg case, the Court was one vote away
from giving extremely strong, if not Justice Douglas' absolute,
protection to the press's First Amendment claims.
The Branzburg Court majority, unfortunately, took a much more
distressing tack. In an opinion, written by Justice Byron White, the
Court sharply rejected the broad contours of the First Amendment
claims. Emphasizing the importance of investigating and prosecuting
criminal wrongdoing, the Court held that the First Amendment did not
afford the journalists a broad right to protect their confidential sources
24
against otherwise legitimate grand jury inquiries.
How broad or narrow that ruling was has been the subject -of
debate ever since. Some have claimed that the Court categorically
rejected First Amendment protection for confidential sources, except in
rare cases of bad faith or harassing investigation by prosecutors.
Others, buoyed by a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, whose
vote was decisive to the outcome, argued that there would have to be an
ad hoc balancing of interests in each case.
And thus the lines were drawn, and the battle over the right of
journalists to protect their confidential sources has raged ever since on a
number of fronts.

II.

WHERE HAVE WE COME?

In the wake of Branzburg, what recourse did the press have to try

23 Id. at 722.

24 Id. at 665 (majority opinion).
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to protect its confidential sources? A number of options were available.
First, there was the effort to rely on the presence of Justice
Powell's concurring opinion to argue that the Court decision and the
First Amendment required a traditional balancing of the interests in
each case. That balancing would essentially ask: how much did the
government or the litigants need the information in the particular
circumstance and what alternatives were available other than getting it
from the press? Some lower court cases had taken this approach pre25
Branzburg,and the Court's decision arguably authorized it henceforth.
Second, there was the prospect of statutory protection. A number
of "shield laws" had been enacted by States, and they often provided
26
significant, if not complete, protection to journalistic sources.
Immediately following the Court's Branzburg decision, there was a
push to enact a federal shield law, which would give similar statutory
protection in federal judicial and administrative proceedings and which
would, as a practical matter, have been a significant barrier to
interference with confidential sources. Despite a flurry of hearings later
that year, no federal legislative progress was made. 27 It is 35 years later,
and that is still the case, although a bill has recently passed the House
28
Judiciary Committee.
Finally, there were the relatively new Justice Department
Guidelines on subpoenaing news sources.
Those guidelines,
promulgated, ironically, by then Attorney General John Mitchell, no
friend of the media and vice versa, required that federal lawyers also go
through a balancing process before seeking confidential information
from the press. 29 Though there was a debate about whether these
guidelines were judicially enforceable as administrative regulations,
their presence provided a practical buffer to indiscriminate and
unnecessary intrusion on press information by federal attorneys.
A.
First,

The Development of the Federal Case Law

through

the

process

of

case-by-case

constitutional

25 See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
26 The Court's opinion in Branzburg noted that 17 States in 1972 provided some type of
statutory protection to ajournalist's confidential sources. Id. at 689 n.27.
27 See Newsmens' Privilege, Hearings Before Subcom. No. 3, H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

92nd Cong. (1972).
28 On August 1, 2007, the House Judiciary Committee, by voice vote, passed H.R. 2102, The
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007. See S. 1267, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (1st sess. 2007). The
bill passed the full House on October 16 2007 by a vote of 398 to 21 and has passed the Senate
Judiciary Committee. President Bush has threatened to veto the measure if it reaches his desk.
See Elizabeth Williamson, House Passes Bill to Protect Confidentiality of Reporters' Sources,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2007, at A03.
29 The Guidelines can be found at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2008).

1406

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

adjudication, the lower courts have given a variety of differing
interpretations to the Court's Branzburg ruling. Some courts, for
example, have viewed its precedential scope as limited to grand jury
criminal investigations, feeling free to grant significant First
Amendment protection to journalistic sources outside that setting, in
civil cases, for example. Indeed, in a key case decided shortly after
Branzburg, the Second Circuit held that in civil cases the First
Amendment required a careful balancing of whether the "public interest
in non-disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources outweighs the
public and private interest in compelled testimony. ' 30 In that case, the
Court ruled the reporter could not be made to testify.
In the years since then, dozens, perhaps hundreds, of decisions
have been handed down recognizing various degrees of First
Amendment protection of confidential sources, such that press
advocates could confidently claim that, a quarter century after the defeat
in Branzburg, that the courts have generally come to recognize a
broadly recognized constitutional Qualified Privilege to protect
confidential sources. Indeed, starting shortly after Branzburg, in civil
cases, courts had consistently rebuffed efforts to probe confidential
sources (except perhaps in libel and similar suits against the press itself
for serious derelictions of responsible reporting or editing) so much that
one could almost say that in civil cases there was a de facto "absolute
privilege. '31 In 1998, for example, the Second Circuit observed:
The law in this Circuit is clear that to protect the important interests

of reporters and the public in preserving the confidentiality of
journalists' sources, disclosure may be ordered only upon a clear and
specific showing that the information is: highly material and
relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and
32
not obtainable from other available sources.

One could accurately say that the press had lost the battle in
Branzburg, but won the war in three decades of lower court rulings
giving a narrow interpretation to that ruling and finding broad room for
First Amendment protection of confidential sources. 33 In more recent

years, however, the press would come in for a bit of a rude awakening.
Despite the numerous cases recognizing strong First Amendment
protection for confidential sources (and despite a steady growth in the
number of state shield laws or state court decisions strongly protecting
the press's ability to protect confidential sources), two cases in the last
few years have cast a bit of a pall on the sense of the inevitable
30 Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 470 F.2d. 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972).
31 See, e.g., id. See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Privilege of Newsgatherers
Against Disclosure of Confidential Information, 99 A.L.R.3d 37 (1980).
32 Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 186 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting McGrawHill, Inc. v. Arizona (In re Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig.), 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982)).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
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expansion of the scope of confidential source protection.
The first case, McKevitt v. Pallasch,34 involved a decision by Judge
Richard Posner, widely regarded as one of the most astute, and
scholarly judges on the federal bench. The case involved a criminal
defendant being prosecuted in Ireland for directing terrorism, who
wanted journalists to turn over tapes and information concerning a key
prosecution witness, whom the journalists had interviewed for a book.
Although this was not a case where the press's own behavior was at
issue, and the journalists were truly third parties to the events, Judge
Posner nonetheless sustained the order to turn over the tapes and his
decision cataloged the law and concluded rather powerfully that the
concurrence by Justice Powell was too slender a reed upon which to
base the de facto Qualified Privilege which many courts have derived
since 1972.
Perhaps even more deflating was the ruling in the Judith
Miller/Matthew Cooper/Valerie Plame/"Scooter" Libby case. This case
originated in the early months of the Iraq War, the summer of 2003, and
was fueled by developing debates over the Administration's justification
for the war. Joseph Wilson, a former diplomat, wrote an Op Ed piece in
the New York Times indicating that he had been dispatched to Africa to
determine the validity of reports of Saddam Hussein's quest for nuclear
materials, and that such reports were unfounded. The article was
obviously a powerful blow against the White House. A few days later,
prominent conservative columnist Robert Novak wrote about the matter
and quoted a confidential source as indicating that Wilson had been
dispatched on that African trip by his CIA operative wife, Valerie
Plame, an expert on weapons of mass destruction.
The family
connection had the effect of undermining Wilson's article by making it
seem that his trip was more a nepotistic junket arranged by his wife than
a serious study of Iraq's nuclear capacity. Many speculated that
Novak's source was a White House staffer or ally out to undermine
Wilson's report (despite Novak's description of his source as "not a
partisan gunslinger"). Amidst a chorus of cries for an investigation of
the "leak"-including a notorious editorial in the New York Times
supporting such an investigation from the White House35-the Bush
administration felt pressured to accede to demands for appointment of a
special prosecutor to investigate "the leak" and to determine whether
the revelation of Plame's identity violated the laws protecting
intelligence agents' identities36-laws whose passage the press had
strongly resisted. The primary witness lists would consist of White
34 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
35 See Editorial, Investigating Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003 at A30 (opining that the
"Justice Department should focus its attention on the White House, not on journalists").
36 Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000).
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House and high level administration officials and top echelon members
of the Washington press establishment, all of whom would be called
before a federal grand jury by Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald, a
highly visible and highly regarded federal prosecutor. It was a recipe
for a constitutional pile-up.
Then ensued a two-year pitched battle involving the media, the
White House, and the special prosecutor, with a "whole world is
watching" quality as the case unfolded and top level journalists and
political figures were hauled before a Washington, D.C. grand jury to
testify about the Plame leak: what did they know?, and when did they
know it? When the dust had settled, the results were not pretty for the
press or the First Amendment. The District Court's court ruling on the
press claims of First Amendment protection was sharply critical of the
basis for the claim. 37 On appeal, with the most prominent First
Amendment counsel representing an establishment of media
representatives, the results were extremely disappointing.
The
prevailing opinion in the appeals court was almost dismissive of the
constitutional claims, took the adamant position that Branzburg had
clearly considered and rejected any special First Amendment protection
for the press, and scoffed at the Powell concurring opinion as somehow
legitimizing the recognition of rights squarely rejected by the opinion of
the Court, which Powell also joined. 38 There was some solace in the
fact that a concurring opinion in the case did go to considerable lengths
to recognize a common law-as distinct from constitutional-basis for
protecting the press's use of confidential sources. 39 But the formula
crafted by that judge involved highly contingent and subjective
factors-including, quite problematically, how harmful was the impact
of the leak and how important was the news value of the leak. And, at
the end of the day, in applying that balancing approach, the judge
concluded that the press information was important enough to compel
the testimony (in an opinion where eight pages of confidential
information essential to the judges' conclusion about the importance of
the testimony was blocked from public view).
The decision was highly visible in the legal and journalistic
communities, as was the subsequent Supreme Court denial of review,
which was unanimous, 40 despite the large number of media and First
Amendment groups which had asked the Court to intervene on behalf of
the press. You could almost hear the courthouse door slam shut on the
37 See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
38 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 968-72 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
39 See id. at 986 (Tatel, J., concurring).
40 Judith Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005). For one key insider's account of the
legal battles and the whole issue ofjournalists' protecting their confidential sources, see NORMAN
PEARLSTINE, OFF THE RECORD: THE PRESS,
ANONYMOUS SOURCES (2007).

THE GOVERNMENT,
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effort to get the Court to review Branzburg while it still has relevance.
As a consequence of those rulings, when the Scooter Libby case came
to trial-not over the legality of the leaks, but over the alleged perjury
and obstruction of justice in connection with the investigation into those
non-criminal leaks-we had to witness the spectacle of some of the
nation's most prominent national journalists having to testify
indiscriminately about their sources, the use of the information, their
methods of journalism and other tools of the trade that rarely have been
the subject of such open public testimony in the past. It was a doleful
spectacle. As Max Frankel so poignantly noted in his New York Times
magazine article:
So there I sat, watching the United States government in all its
majesty dragging into court the American press (in all its
piety), forcing reporters to betray confidences, rifling their files
and notebooks, making them swear to their confused memories
and motives and burdening their bosses with hefty legal feesall for the high-sounding purpose, yet again, of protecting our
4
nation's secrets. Top-secret secrets! In wartime! '
The results in these cases point up the advantages, but also the
occasional perils, of courts' utilizing a "balancing test" to "weigh" the
interests on both sides and determine whether First Amendment rights
can be overcome in each particular case. During the Branzburg
litigation, some press groups argued for such a balancing approach,
applied strictly and tightly to be sure, that would offer the press basic
constitutional protection to shield sources and information except in
those cases where the government need for the information was really
compelling and going after the press was really the government's only
option. Other press groups argued that if you actually applied the
balancing test in a strict way, there would be very few cases where the
press right would need to yield, and, therefore, recognizing an
"absolute" protection was both not that great a compromise of
governmental interests and also the only practical guarantee of press
freedom to use confidential sources.
There are two reasons why such balancing tests can be very
problematic. First, courts often err on the side of the government, and
the malleability of the verbal formula that embodies such tests is an
invitation to judicial rejection of constitutional protection. One of the
most classic balancing formulas is the well-known "clear and present
danger" test, framed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in a case whose
outcome-punishing anti-war criticism-was clearly wrong, provides
as follows:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
41 Frankel, supra note 2, at 40.
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such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and

present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
Congress
42
degree.

Application of that standard for the next half century resulted in
victories for speakers whose speech was only minimally threatening to
public order, 43 but proved wholly insufficient when push came to shove
to protect more challenging speech and association." Only in more
a refurbished version of that test in
recent times have the Courts applied
45
a more speech protective fashion.
The other reason that a balancing test falls short of providing
significant protection is its lack of predictability. If all a journalist can
tell a source about the law's protection is that it is available depending
on the outcome, months or years later, of a subjective and contingent
legal formula, that is not exactly a recipe for confidence in the mind of
confidential sources. That is particularly true when even highly
conscientious and First Amendment-friendly judges can differ in any
particular case on whether the government's need for the confidential
information is sufficiently pressing so that the rights of the press-and,
46
remember, through the press, the public-must yield.
Obviously, if the choice for the press is a "qualified" privilege, or
none at all, pragmatism dictates opting for the former. But the
protection afforded, especially in cases where it is needed most, may be
so ephemeral that it is equivalent to no protection at all.
The pattern of cases in the wake of the Miller/Cooper matter
certainly provides cause for concern. In a number of prominent cases
since the Miller/Cooper ruling, the press has had mixed results in
continuing to try to prevail in fashioning constitutional or common law
protection for confidential sources.
In one well-known case, Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear scientist working
for the government, sued the government and the press for leaked
stories suggesting he had been involved in espionage and revealing
private information about him and his family. 47 After the press's claims
to protect the confidential sources of the leaks were rejected, 48 the press
and the government settled the suit by each paying a significant amount
of money to Lee. Likewise, another federal appeals court held that a
42 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
43 See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
44 See, e.g, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); cf Communist Party of the U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
45 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
46 See the thoughtful majority and dissenting opinions of Judges Ralph Winter and Robert
Sack, respectively, in New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
47 See Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
48 Id. at 64.
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former college football coach was entitled to discover the identity of
confidential sources for an allegedly defamatory article about him in
Time Magazine, once he exhausted all reasonable means of obtaining
the information elsewhere. 49 This case was settled before further
proceedings as well. In another widely-covered instance, a freelance
video journalist spent several months in jail for refusing to turn over
videotapes of a violent demonstration to a federal grand jury. The Ninth
Circuit rejected the journalist's constitutional and other claims, 50 but
thereafter the tape mysteriously appeared on the internet, obviating the
need for further disposition. A turn of events would also spare the two
Hearst reporters ordered to 18 months in jail, and their newspapers fined
$1,000 per day, for refusing to tell a federal grand jury the identity of
the person who leaked to them confidential federal grand jury minutes
relating to the BALCO steroids investigation in the San Francisco Bay
Area, the same investigation involving Barry Bonds. A District Court
opinion rejected their claims to protection, 5 1 but while the case was
pending on appeal, a lawyer who had once represented BALCO
executives admitted to having been the source of the secret grand jury
transcripts.
Most recently, former government researcher Steven Hatfill,
having been labeled as being involved in the 2001 anthrax attacks,
sought to probe the journalist's governmental sources for the
allegations. Though Hatfill's defamation suit against the press was
dismissed on the grounds that he could not prove "actual malice" by the
reporter (an appeal is pending), his separate breach of privacy suit
against the government was allowed to continue, and reporters writing
about the matter have been ordered to identify their government sources
on penalty of contempt. 52 In ordering the reporters to testify, the
District Court observed: "Denying civil litigants access to the identity of
government officials who have allegedly illegally leaked information to
reporters would effectively leave Privacy Act violations immune from
judicial condemnation, while leaving potential leakers virtually
53
undeterred from engaging in such misbehavior."
In almost all of these cases the press has had its legal claims
rejected, but reporters have avoided actually having to testify because
the matter was resolved in some other way. But these cases pose a
particular difficulty because the leaked information is the gravamen of
the civil or criminal harm being pursued. It is understandable to yield to
49 See Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d. 1327 (11 th Cir. 2005).
50 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolfe v. United States, 201 F. App'x 430 (9th Cir.
2006).
51 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to Mark Fainaru-Wadu and Lance Williams, 438 F. Supp.
2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
52 See Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33, 50 (D.D.C. 2007).
53 Id. at 45.
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the temptation to say that the press should not be allowed to hide behind
the First Amendment when its own reporting causes the alleged harm.
But that perspective has the 20/20 advantage of hindsight. When the
reporter is doing the story, however, he may not know what kind of
legal claims the story may generate three years down the road, and he or
she has to be able to give the guarantee of anonymity now. Likewise,
though some stories may result in personal harm to individuals, that
harm may be in the context of reporting that serves the public interest in
the flow of information, particularly about government policies and
processes.
B.

The Promise of State Law

Our federalism has played a vital role in addressing the issue of
confidential source protection. Surprisingly, the strongest argument that
we can live with, giving the press an "absolute" right to protect
confidential sources without the sky or the Republic falling, comes from
the area where the press has been most successful in getting recognition
for protection of its rights: namely, state law, especially statutory law.
At the time of Branzburg, seventeen states had some form of "shield
law" protecting the press against having to reveal confidential sources,
and many of these shield laws provided "absolute" as opposed to
qualified or balancing-determined protection. Since Branzburg's
rejection of a broad constitutional privilege, many states have enacted or
reaffirmed such state shield laws, and, at the time of the Miller/Cooper
case, thirty-one states gave strong statutory protection, often "absolute"
protection, to journalist sources. Another dozen or so states have
judicial decisions providing comparable state common law protections
in the absence of such statutes. As a result almost every state now
affords either state statutory or common law protection to journalists'
use of confidential sources in state judicial or administrative
54
proceedings.
Thus, on this difficult issue, the states have served as the individual
laboratories that Justice Brandeis celebrated a century ago. 55 Indeed, in
the Miller/Cooper case, the journalists' request for Supreme Court
54 The New York shield law is contained in the N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (2008). It
provides absolute protection for confidential news and qualified protection for non-confidential
news. For an article discussing the overall interpretation and application of the New York shield
law, see David Paul Horowitz, 2005-2006 Survey of New York Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999,
1021-24 (2007).
55 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the

rest of the country.").
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review was supported by a coalition of thirty-four state attorneys
general. These state law enforcement officials took the position that
the absence of federal constitutional or other uniform protection for
journalist sources undermines the States' policy choices to protect
journalists' sources and ignores the fact that law enforcement in those
states are able to function effectively without having to impose upon
journalists. The states' point was that often the journalist or the source
will not know if the subject matter of the story will lead to possible
federal judicial proceedings-where confidentiality may not be
available--or state judicial proceedings-where there is probably a
protective shield law. This uncertainty undermines the likelihood that
the source will cooperate with the journalist and thereby undercuts the
states' policy of protecting journalists' sources. Hard cases make
strange bedfellows.
C.

The Department of Justice Guidelines

As noted above, the executive branch has played a role in helping
the press protect its confidential sources. As the Branzburg cases were
unfolding, Attorney General John Mitchell, certainly no partisan of the
press, promulgated Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media,
requiring the Department of Justice to balance the harm to First
Amendment interests against the need for the information before going
after the press. Now codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10, these Guidelines
have protected the press in a wide variety of circumstances, and have
formed part of the protective legal culture in which broader legal
recognition of press rights could occur. They have validated the notion
that subpoenas to journalists should be a last resort, not a first option.
On the other hand, as Max Frankel pointed out in this symposium, the
Miller/Cooper case was conducted pursuant to those Guidelines, and
they did not stop an avid prosecutor from going after the press and an
appellate court from approving the disclosures. Moreover, it is not at all
clear whether those Guidelines are judicially enforceable.
D.

A FederalShield Law?

The one source of law that has not addressed this issue is any kind
of federal legislative shield law. In the wake of the Branzburg decision,
there were bills introduced in both houses to remedy the gap in federal
protection created by the Court's decision.5 6 But nothing came of those
56 1 had the privilege of testifying before both the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees
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early efforts, despite a good deal of support for a bill. Now, however, in
the wake of the Miller/Cooper case and others, the question of
protection of confidential sources has become a significant legislative
matter once again, with liberals and conservatives joining together to
support a bill. Indeed, at this writing, a bill, the Free Flow of
Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, recently passed the House
Judiciary Committee by voice vote. 57 Its prospects in the Senate are
on the proposed legislation, accompanied each time by a first-rate journalist: Victor Navasky
before the House Committee, and Brit Hume on the Senate side.
57 The text of the bill is as follows:
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007 (Introduced in House)
HR 2102 IH
110th CONGRESS
I st Session
H. R. 2102
To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for
the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons connected
with the news media.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 2, 2007
Mr. BOUCHER (for himself, Mr. PENCE, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. COBLE, Mr.
YARMUTH, and Mr. WALDEN of Oregon) introduced the following bill; which
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for
the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons connected
with the news media.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Free Flow of Information Act of 2007'.
SEC. 2. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COVERED PERSONS.
(a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure- In any proceeding or in connection with
any issue arising under Federal law, a Federal entity may not compel a covered
person to provide testimony or produce any document related to information
possessed by such covered person as part of engaging in journalism, unless a
court determines by a preponderance of the evidence, after providing notice and
an opportunity to be heard to such covered person(1) that the party seeking to compel production of such testimony or
document has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources (other than a
covered person) of the testimony or document;
(2) that(A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information
obtained from a person other than the covered person(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
occurred; and
(ii) the testimony or document sought is essential to the
investigation or prosecution or to the defense against the
prosecution; or
(B) in a matter other than a criminal investigation or prosecution,
based on information obtained from a person other than the covered
person, the testimony or document sought is essential to the successful
completion of the matter;
(3) in the case that the testimony or document sought could reveal the
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identity of a source of information or include any information that could
reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of the identity of such a
source, that(A) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to prevent
imminent and actual harm to national security with the objective to
prevent such harm;
(B) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to prevent
imminent death or significant bodily harm with the objective to prevent
such death or harm, respectively; or
(C) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to identify
a person who has disclosed(i) a trade secret of significant value in violation of a State or
Federal law;
(ii) individually identifiable health information, as such term is
defined in section 1171(6) of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 1320d(6)), in violation of Federal law; or
(iii) nonpublic personal information, as such term is defined in
section 509(4) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C.
6809(4)), of any consumer in violation of Federal law; and
(4) that nondisclosure of the information would be contrary to the public
interest, taking into account both the public interest in compelling disclosure
and the public interest in gathering news and maintaining the free flow of
information.
(b) Limitations on Content of Information- The content of any testimony or
document that is compelled under subsection (a) shall, to the extent possible(1) be limited to the purpose of verifying published information or
describing any surrounding circumstances relevant to the accuracy of such
published information; and
(2) be narrowly tailored in subject matter and period of time covered so as to
avoid compelling production of peripheral, nonessential, or speculative
information.
SEC. 3. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
PROVIDERS.
(a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure- With respect to testimony or any
document consisting of any record, information, or other communication that
relates to a business transaction between a communications service provider and a
covered person, section 2 shall apply to such testimony or document if sought
from the communications service provider in the same manner that such section
applies to any testimony or document sought from a covered person.
(b) Notice and Opportunity Provided to Covered Persons- A court may compel
the testimony or disclosure of a document under this section only after the party
seeking such a document provides the covered person who is a party to the
business transaction described in subsection (a)(1) notice of the subpoena or other compulsory request for such testimony or
disclosure from the communications service provider not later than the time
at which such subpoena or request is issued to the communications service
provider; and
(2) an opportunity to be heard before the court before the time at which the
testimony or disclosure is compelled.
(c) Exception to Notice Requirement- Notice under subsection (b)(1) may be
delayed only if the court involved determines by clear and convincing evidence
that such notice would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal
investigation.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER- The term 'communications
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uncertain, but a number of Senators on both sides of the aisle have

indicated support for the bill or one like it. Of course, any legislation of
this kind, which would give journalists protection in federal judicial and
administrative proceedings, poses a number of key questions, most
significantly what are the contours of such a privilege, how can it be
defeated and who can invoke its protections.
H.R. 2102 provides that the federal government could not compel a

person covered by the statute to provide testimony or produce
documents without first showing the need to do so by a preponderance
of evidence. The content of compelled testimony or documents must be

limited and narrowly tailored, and certain financial or commercial
information is exempt.

At the heart of the bill is the provision that

journalists can be compelled to reveal the identity of sources only when
the court finds it necessary to prevent "imminent and actual harm to
national security" or "imminent death or significant bodily harm."
However, journalists may also be compelled to identify a person who
has disclosed trade secrets, protected health information, or nonpublic

personal information of any consumer in violation of current law.
Interestingly, in terms of whether the First Amendment should protect
the proverbial "pajama-clad bloggers" the bill would cover and protect
Journalism is defined as "the
anyone "engaged in journalism."

gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing,
editing, reporting or publishing of news and information for
dissemination to the public." While the bill does not explicitly protect
bloggers, to the extent a court determines they are engaged in the
practice of journalism, they are likely to be shielded. 58 The act
service provider'(A) means any person that transmits information of the customer's
choosing by electronic means; and
(B) includes a telecommunications carrier, an information service provider,
an interactive computer service provider, and an information content
provider (as such terms are defined in sections 3 and 230 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153, 230)).
(2) COVERED PERSON- The term 'covered person' means a person engaged in
journalism and includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of
such covered person.
(3) DOCUMENT- The term 'document' means writings, recordings, and
photographs, as those terms are defined by Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 (28
U.S.C. App.).
(4) FEDERAL ENTITY- The term 'Federal entity' means an entity or employee
of the judicial or executive branch or an administrative agency of the Federal
Government with the power to issue a subpoena or issue other compulsory
process.
(5) JOURNALISM- The term 'journalism' means the gathering, preparing,
collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing of
news or information that concerns local, national, or international events or other
matters of public interest for dissemination to the public.
58 One California state court has held that bloggers are entitled to the full protection of the
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additionally applies to communications service providers with regard to
testimony or any record, information or other communication that
relates to a business transaction between such providers and covered
persons. This latter provision would overturn the result of the case of
New York Times Co. v. Gonzales,59 where a sharply divided Second
Circuit upheld the right of the government to subpoena phone records of
Times' reporters in an attempt to learn who might have discussed
sensitive material with a reporter in a way that allegedly compromised a
government terrorism investigation.
As was the case with the Qualified Privilege that courts had
fashioned over the years, this bill is probably better than no bill at all.
And it certainly attempts to limit the generic kind of circumstances
when the identity of confidential sources can be breached to cases of
"imminent and actual harm to national security" or "imminent death or
significant bodily harm." But the latter category can cover a number of
law enforcement scenarios, and the specific exceptions from protection
for health or consumer information would seem to have the potential for
opening a major loophole in the statute's protection. If the bill becomes
the law, we will have lots of cases answering these questions.

III.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

Finally, how have the debates and disputes of the last three yearssparked by the Miller/Cooper case and the reactions to it, within
courtrooms, newsrooms and seminar rooms-impacted our views on all
of these questions?
Let me hazard a few of my own reactions to these recent events:
1. Watch out what you wish for. Soon after the Valerie Plame leak
first surfaced in the Robert Novak column, the CIA requested that the
Justice Department investigate for possible violation of the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act. That one sentence has four things that
immediately should have set off the loudest of First Amendment alarms:
leaks, Justice Department Investigation of the press, Intelligence
Identities Protection Act, and CIA. For those of us who had lived
through the era of the Pentagon Papers case, the Branzburg case, the
Agee 60 and Snepp 6 1 cases on punishing CIA leaks and leakers, and the
California shield law. See O'Grady v. Super Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Ct. App. 2006).
59 459 F. 3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). At this writing the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007,
which affords very strong, but not absolute protection, to journalists from having to reveal
confidential sources unless the government makes a compelling showing of the need to breach
that protection in any particular case, has passed the House but not the Senate. This is the first
time such a bill has passed either house of Congress. See supra note 28.
60 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
61 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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debates over the constitutionality of criminalizing such leaks, the whole
thing seemed like "deja vu all over again." Yet, in precisely the
precincts where the bells should have gone off the loudest came a
surprisingly contrary message. A well known New York Times editorial
strongly supported such an investigation, while admonishing the
government to "focus its attention on the White House, not on
journalists. ' 62 Right. More recently, the CIA requested a new Justice
Department investigation, this time of a news story about alleged CIA
torture sites in Eastern Europe. And so it goes. To their credit, a
number of news organizations filed a brief in the Judith Miller case
questioning whether the Identities Act covered Plame at all. And, as
events in the Libby case would reveal, the government never had
enough evidence to charge anyone with violation of that Act. So, after
three years and millions of dollars of investigation, there turned out to
have been no crime committed, except in connection with investigating
the crime that was never committed. What is worse is that the
prosecutor apparently knew early on who the source of the
Plame/Novak leak was, and it turned out to be a high ranking State
Department official who was against the Iraq war in the first place. So
any sense that the White House was leaking sensitive information to
benefit itself politically or as a vendetta against ambassador Wilson was
dispelled almost immediately. What could have possibly justified a
continuation of the prosecution? Scooter Libby was convicted, but the
First Amendment was diminished. All in all a pretty bad trade-off.
As one media observer put it:
I think my fellow liberals, partaking in some hypocrisy of their own,
have failed to grasp the true toll of this inquisition. We're supposed
to be champions of the First Amendment and foes of overzealous
prosecutors. For most of the postwar era, we were the ones who
demanded greater exposure of government secrets, sharper
skepticism about blanket claims of "national security," and stronger
support for reporters against the assaults of the organized right. In
keeping with those convictions, we should have protested this
overwrought case from the start. In fact, applauding it actually
benefits the Bush administration-and future regimes of its ilk-by
further sanctifying secrecy and demonizing the press.63
2. Do not take sides. A good story is a good story no matter where
the chips may fall, and no matter who the sources are or whether you
would vote for them. I learned from years as an ACLU lawyer that you
have to protect everyone's right to speak, not just the speakers you like.
First Amendment rights are indivisible and non-partisan. The same
should be true of confidential sources and stories about government
62 InvestigatingLeaks, supra note 35, at A30.
63 David Greenberg, Trial and Error,NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 5-Mar. 12, 2007, at 11.
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wrongdoing.
If you denigrate the sources you do not like, you
undermine your credibility to claim protection for the ones you do. The
Valerie Plame story was as much about Plame and her husband and
their motivations, as it was about the White House efforts to manipulate
the story. Those who leaked the Plame story to the press were as much
a part of the same process of informing the public as was the original
Deep Throat. The only question is whether the source is reliable, not
whether the source is noble or lovable. Journalists rely on sources with
questionable motives every hour of every day. It turns out that Mark
Felt-Deep Throat-was not a purely motivated prince either. He was
just a disappointed office seeker getting back at his bosses. But his
information for the public was vital. So we applaud him and the
reporters who protected his identity.
It is difficult to resist the sense that those members of the press
who supported the leak investigation and attacked the leaks were
animated by an animus for the policies and politics of the Bush
Administration which trumped what should have been their normal
protectiveness toward the press's role in protecting the public's right to
know. As Max Frankel put it so well in the Symposium:
A reporter covering the Pentagon, the CIA, or foreign affairs and
wars simply cannot function unless a large number of officials from
the president on down-for both noble and vile reasons-are willing
to talk about those secrets on a confidential basis. The price of
learning about eavesdropping and the price of learning about these
awful renditions of prisoners around the world and of the torture that
we engage in has to be paid by also allowing the Libbys of this world
64
to pass secrets for less noble reasons.
3. Special prosecutorspose special problems. Without revisiting
the whole question of the constitutional validity and political wisdom of
the use of special prosecutors, it is sufficient to observe that Justice
Scalia was absolutely right in 1988 when he was the only Justice to
challenge the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel law. 6 5 The
most eloquent testimony to the wisdom of his position was that the
Democrats in 1998 let the Independent Counsel law die without
renewal. In his prophetic dissent, Justice Scalia had described the
prosecutorial dangers to the civil liberties of individuals when you have
a politically unaccountable "independent" prosecutor, no matter how
professional and fair-minded that person may be. If you think this view
is just the Wall Street Journal's morning line, read Jeffrey Rosen's
excellent piece in The New Republic, where he called the Libby
indictment indefensible and concluded that it showed "the entire
64 Max Frankel, Panel Discussion at Cardozo Law School: Are Journalists Pnvileged? (Apr.
23, 2007), in 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361 (2008).
65 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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apparatus of special prosecutors is a menace. ' 66 Remember that this
professional and fair-minded person-Patrick Fitzgerald-managed to
haul representatives of the core of the news media establishment in front
of a grand jury, and in some cases, repeatedly, to force them to testify.
Even Ken Starr did not do that. As former Solicitor General Ted Olson
reportedly put it, in commenting on the prospect that the key witness
scheduled against Libby was going to be NBC's Tim Russert, the
special prosecutor was giving a whole new meaning to the concept of
"Meet the Press."
The First Amendment belongs to everyone. The First
4.
Amendment should protect everyone who uses it. In the push to
establish constitutional or statutory protection for protecting
confidential sources, we should not forget the bloggers. Freedom of the
Press should not belong just to those who own one, or to those who
graduate from a journalism school. It should protect all those who seek
to inform the public, whether or not they wear bathrobes or have fancy
credentials and mastheads. 67 More broadly, we sail into treacherous
constitutional waters when we have a kind of First Amendment "caste
system" decreeing that some people or groups can speak on some
subjects at some times and places, and others cannot. We have been
foundering in that kind of whirlpool in the campaign finance regulation
area, 68 and, in my view, it is destructive of First Amendment coherence.
5. The First Amendment is indivisible. The First Amendment
should be indivisible. Remember Justice Douglas. His strong views of
press freedom were part of his larger vision of a First Amendment that
protected all speakers in all forums reflecting all parts of the political
spectrum. Journalists should remember that the next time they write a
story or editorial applauding laws against cigarette advertising or urging
laws to deal with "negative" campaigning or excessive campaign
spending. A First Amendment that only protects some will wind up not
protecting anyone at all. The rights you save may truly be your own.
6. Has the game been worth the candle? Finally, we should ask
ourselves what has society gained from the Branzburg regime. Have
we solved or deterred important crimes that would not have been
Have journalists ever
otherwise interdicted by law enforcement?
provided the smoking gun to help catch a killer or a terrorist, or just a
leaker? Conversely, would the country have been harmed if Justice
Douglas's position supporting an absolute privilege for journalists been
66 Jeffrey Rosen, Overcharged,NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 2005, at 14.
67 1 was once part of a student group who met the legendary columnist, Drew Pearson, at his

home in Washington, D.C, and he was wearing his bathrobe when he greeted us. On second
thought, it might have been a smoking jacket.
68 See particularly Justice Kennedy's opinions in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 405 (2000) and McConnell v. FederalElections Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 286
(2003).
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accepted? This question is especially pertinent in light of the fact that
numerous state shield laws-many in populous states like New York
and California-provide
comparable "absolute"
protection to
confidential sources. Has the gain to law enforcement been worth the
loss to the First Amendment?
A proper respect for the First
Amendment requires that we at least ask these questions.

